Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Although task-unrelated thinking has been increasingly investigated in recent years, the content and correlates of everyday off-task thought in clinical d...

The Cell Ontology (CL) is designed to provide a standardized representation of cell types for data annotation. Currently, the CL employs multiple is_a relations, defining cell types in terms of histological, functional, and lineage properties, and the majority of definitions are written with sufficient generality to hold across multiple species. This approach limits the CL’s utility for cross-species data integration. To address this problem, we developed a method for the ontological representation of cells and applied this method to develop a (...) dendritic cell ontology (DC-CL). DC-CL subtypes are delineated on the basis of surface protein expression, systematically including both species-general and species-specific types and optimizing DC-CL for the analysis of flow cytometry data. This approach brings benefits in the form of increased accuracy, support for reasoning, and interoperability with other ontology resources. 104. Barry Smith, “Toward a Realistic Science of Environments”, Ecological Psychology, 2009, 21 (2), April-June, 121-130. Abstract: The perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson embraces a radically externalistic view of mind and action. We have, for Gibson, not a Cartesian mind or soul, with its interior theater of contents and the consequent problem of explaining how this mind or soul and its psychological environment can succeed in grasping physical objects external to itself. Rather, we have a perceiving, acting organism, whose perceptions and actions are always already tuned to the parts and moments, the things and surfaces, of its external environment. We describe how on this basis Gibson sought to develop a realist science of environments which will be ‘consistent with physics, mechanics, optics, acoustics, and chemistry’. (shrink)

The traces of real, that is, ancient, rival versions of Terence's lines are not so pronounced as of Plautus' lines. Professor Lindsay has drawn attention to a possible instance at Hec. 468 . Another seems to be Andr. 532 , if I am right in supposing that the text used by Donatus had ipsum Chremem. A trace of the variant survives in the unmetrical δ-setting ipsum obuiam Chremem DGL. The text of the other minuscule MSS. has ipsum obuiam. A (...) is not in evidence for this part of Andria. Had it too ipsum Chremem ? (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

John Henry Newman is widely acknowledged to be an important theologian. However Newman commentators suggest that his work has received little recognition by philosophers. The general consensus has been that until the latter part of the twentieth century Newman has been an isolated philosophical figure. This essay offers an historical re-evaluation of Newman's philosophical reception in order to explore whether or not his significance has been underestimated. The historical method is used in the analysis and assessment of this question. The (...) study therefore probes the general philosophical reaction to Newman's work in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In doing so the essay offers an historical investigation and re-evaluation of the claims of Newman having a negligible philosophical legacy. (shrink)

In Plautus and elsewhere in old Latin there is an imperative suffix -mino of medio-deponential meaning: opperimino, PL True. 188 , progredimino, id. Pseud. 859, arbitramino, id. Epid. 695, praefamino, Cato, RR. 141, 2, famino Paul. Fest. 62, 10, Th., all 2 sg.; in legal documents, antestamino , in the XII Tables, fruimino , CIL. 1, 199, profitemino in Lex Iulia Municipalis, all 3 sg. The generally accepted explanation of the form is that it arose from a contamination of the (...) ordinary 2 pl. medio-passive imperative in -mini and the 2, 3 sg. forms in -to, Lindsay, Latin Language, p. 517, Von Planta, Gramm. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. II, pp. 310 sqq., Buck, Elementarb. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. p. 112, Sommer, Hdb. d. lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre, p. 366, Stolz, Lat. Gramm*. p. 158. The Oskan and the Umbrian forms in -mo, -mu, U. spahamu, eturstahmu, persnimu, O. censamur, all of 2 or 3 sg., and U. arsmahamo, caterahamo of 2 or 3 pi., are identified with the Lat. -minō forms on the assumption that the Osk-Umbr. -mu represents an older *-mnō which in turn arose by syncope from -*menō Von Planta, l.c. This explanation is the most satisfactory that has been given, and we may suppose that Latin, Oskan, and Umbrian had an imperative form in *-menō. (shrink)

In Plautus and elsewhere in old Latin there is an imperative suffix -mino of medio-deponential meaning: opperimino, PL True. 188, progredimino, id. Pseud. 859, arbitramino, id. Epid. 695, praefamino, Cato, RR. 141, 2, famino Paul. Fest. 62, 10, Th., all 2 sg.; in legal documents, antestamino, in the XII Tables, fruimino, CIL. 1, 199, profitemino in Lex Iulia Municipalis, all 3 sg. The generally accepted explanation of the form is that it arose from a contamination of the ordinary 2 pl. (...) medio-passive imperative in -mini and the 2, 3 sg. forms in -to, Lindsay, Latin Language, p. 517, Von Planta, Gramm. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. II, pp. 310 sqq., Buck, Elementarb. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. p. 112, Sommer, Hdb. d. lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre, p. 366, Stolz, Lat. Gramm*. p. 158. The Oskan and the Umbrian forms in -mo, -mu, U. spahamu, eturstahmu, persnimu, O. censamur, all of 2 or 3 sg., and U. arsmahamo, caterahamo of 2 or 3 pi., are identified with the Lat. -minō forms on the assumption that the Osk-Umbr. -mu represents an older *-mnō which in turn arose by syncope from -*menō Von Planta, l.c. This explanation is the most satisfactory that has been given, and we may suppose that Latin, Oskan, and Umbrian had an imperative form in *-menō. (shrink)

The contributors to this collection of essays offer a stimulating and varied range of approaches to this developing area. The volume includes discussions on the concept of education and such related topics as indoctrination and the nature and scope of the theory of education. Aspects of education including the field of moral education, and issues which are reflected prominently in the curricula of such subjects as Mathematics and Science in schools and colleges are considered.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, addresses key (...) systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

This article seeks to present Vygotsky's theoretical perspective as an integral whole as an antidote to the desire to plunder his work for isolated insights. The first part of the paper treats Vygotsky's views on method: his critique of the prevailing psychological orthodoxies; his recommendation that the higher mental functions be seen as standing in interfunctional relations of mutual determination; his technique of 'unit analysis'. The second part discusses the method in action: Vygotsky's genetic account of the development of consciousness, (...) on which the key point in ontogenesis is taken to be the convergence of two intitially independently developing faculties: thought and speech; the notion of internalisation and its defence; the critique of Piaget; the concept of 'inner speech' and developed thought. The author hopes this article will serve as an aid to reading the limited sources of Vygotsky's writings presently available in English. (shrink)

In his 1922/1923 articles for the Japanese magazine _Kaizō_, Edmund Husserl identifies a particular “humanity” or human culture by the purposeful idea [_Zweckidee_] consciously embraced by the community. This purposeful idea is attained through rational self-formation on the part of the community in a manner analogous to the rational self-formation of the individual human being. Thereafter, it can be referenced to distinguish different cultures (or stages of cultural development) from one another through its objective manifestation in communal groups and cultural (...) products, as Husserl retraces in a historical account of the development of Western history. This paper explores the essential character of this conception of the purposeful idea from both an exegetical and a systematic perspective, examining in particular the relationship between such an idea and the values experienced by individual subjects within a culture (which are, according to Husserl, also available at the level of objective culture in relation to a communal subject). The paper argues that Husserl’s basic conception of the purposeful idea is a good model for understanding certain essential characteristics of cultural constitution in general, although some of his fundamental assumptions—especially the strict identity he attempts to establish between a purposeful idea as such and the specific goal of universal, rational self-understanding—turn out to be somewhat more questionable in light of the connection between the purposeful idea and the genuinely felt values underlying it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne long-running conundrum in Husserlian phenomenology revolves around the question of the identity of what Husserl calls the transcendental ego, a mysterious figure that he identifies as the subject of a genuinely transcendental phenomenology. In dialogue with both Husserl and his assistant and collaborator Eugen Fink, I attempt in this article to give a solid account of the identity of this transcendental ego, and in particular to explain the connection between this figure and the empirical ego of the individual phenomenologist. (...) I make particular reference to Fink's depiction of a "personal union" between these two egos in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation and to certain unclear hints in Husserl's 1923/1924 lectures on First Philosophy. Ultimately, I develop my own account of such a union, which explains the transcendental ego as a certain mode in which the phenomenologist might investigate his own experiences. On this basis, I argue, the status of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline can be understood without subjecting that discipline to certain criticisms that have been levelled against it. (shrink)

" Waldie speculates on the meanings and implications of the snapshots in this book and of snapshots generally, which he sees as expressions of "the hunger of memory.".